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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between
the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is
championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the concep-
tion of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen
Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the con-
trary, they are not to be as easily aligned as some might sus-
pect or hope, and in particular that an individual can be
granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being
granted second-personal authority. This view is defended
by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's
Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and for-
giveness, and of the master/slave dialectic.
1 | INTRODUCTION
On the face of it, it makes a lot of sense to consider the connections between the notion of recognition associated with
Hegel and some of his successors, such as Axel Honneth,1 and the idea of the second-personal, which has recently been
labelled as such by Stephen Darwall, but which may be traced back to earlier writers such as Martin Buber and Emman-
uel Levinas, among others.2 While neither side has made anything of this connection until recently, nonetheless given
that both center on our inter-personal relations and how we view each other and our mutual status, the idea of putting
the two approaches into some sort of dialogue would seem an inevitable step forward. However, perhaps somewhat
perversely, my aim in this paper is to cast doubt on how far this convergence should be expected to go. More specifi-
cally, I want to raise this question: Is what Hegel means by recognition really second-personal: that is, does recognition
of person X by person Y necessarily involve Y seeing X as standing in a second-personal relation to Y? In asking this
question, throughout I will be adopting Darwall's technical conception of the second-personal, which treats this relation
as some sort of authority relation, and thus as deontic, as in the following characterization: “When someone attempts to
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give another a second-person reason, she purports to stand in a relevant authority relation to her addressee”
(Darwall, 2006, p. 4).3 I will therefore not be questioning whether Hegelian recognition is second-personal in some
broader sense, such as being interpersonal, reciprocal or dialogical (which I believe it is).
It is worth contrasting the question I want to ask from the converse question, namely, does a second-personal
relation have to involve recognition? It would seem that the answer to this question is straightforwardly positive, as
in giving someone a second-personal reason to act, I “address” the other, in a way that presumes they recognize my
entitlement to do so, and so recognize me—otherwise they would see me as merely coercing them. But a slightly har-
der question is whether a second-personal relation has to involve mutual recognition? Here, again, however, it looks
like the answer should be positive, as in this relation I recognize the other person's capacity and entitlement to see
my authority over them as legitimate, otherwise I would again be setting out merely to coerce them—so I must also
recognize them. It thus seems right to say that the second-personal relation has to involve mutual recognition. But
this does not entail that the relation has to involve recognition of each other as equals: a commanding officer may
have to recognize me to some degree, but my recognition of the officer may accord them standing and authority
over some matters in relation to me that I lack in relation to them. However, it could be argued that if the second-
personal relation concerns moral reasons, then recognition has to be equal as well as mutual.4
Having briefly explored the connection in this one direction, let us now return to my original question, and explore
it in the other direction: given that the second-personal relation has to involve recognition, does recognition have to be
second-personal? Of course, it is pretty clear that it can be second-personal: but the question is whether it has to be?
It may seem that from a Hegelian perspective (to be discussed further below) it is again clear that the answer to
this question also has to be positive. And even aside from Hegelian considerations, there may seem to be strong gro-
unds on which to answer this question positively, based on something like the following argument:
1. Recognition is of individuals as persons.
2. To recognize someone as a person is to see them as standing in a second-personal relation to you.
3. Therefore, recognition is second-personal.
In what follows, however, I am going to challenge these claims, both those based on Hegelian considerations, and the
more general argument outlined above. To do so, I am going to focus on two key Hegelian text in this area, from Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit. First, in Section 2, I am going to consider the discussion of conscience, evil and forgiveness at the
end of the Chapter 6 on “Spirit,” which comes just before the discussion of “Religion” in Chapter 7, and in which Hegel
presents his central case of what he means by mutual recognition. I take it that if I can establish that in this text, Hegelian
recognition can be understood in a way that does not involve a second-personal relation as characterized above, then this
is enough to show there are Hegelian grounds to deny that the latter is necessary for the former. However, then in Sec-
tion 3 I will consider a second key text, which is of course the master/slave dialectic in the “Self-Consciousness” chapter.
This text, and particularly the “life and death struggle” which lies at its heart, is often interpreted precisely as a struggle
for second-personal authority. I will argue, however, that my reading of the forgiveness section puts pressure on this
reading, and that there is a more textually plausible interpretation, which shows that even here, second-personal authority
is not the issue, so that this struggle for recognition should not be read in these terms. I will then suggest in Section 4 that
what we can learn from these Hegelian texts gives us enough to reject the general argument outlined above. Having said
what I think Hegelian recognition is not, in the last main section, I will briefly offer a positive account of what it is instead,
and how on this account there can also be an argument for it having to involve mutuality or reciprocity.
2 | RECOGNITION, CONFESSION, AND FORGIVENESS
While Hegel offers a brief and schematic account of what he means by mutual recognition in the prelude to the mas-
ter/slave dialectic (Hegel, 1988b, pp. 127–129, §§177–184), which includes his famous comment that through this
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recognition Spirit will be an “‘I’ that is ‘We’ and a ‘We’ that is ‘I’” (Hegel, 1988b, p. 127, §177),5 it is only several
hundred pages later that we are given a concrete and substantive example of such mutual recognition, namely in the
section on “Conscience” at the end of the chapter on “Spirit,” and discussion there of confession and forgiveness. In
assessing the relation between recognition and second-personal authority, therefore, this is a crucial text.
Now, in this section, it has seemed to many readers that Hegel offers an account of mutual recognition where
each consciousness accepts that the other has the authority to act as judge over it, and thus that each accepts a
second-personal relation with the other, in acknowledging the legitimacy of the other to hold them to account, while
they can do likewise to the other. Thus, it has often been assumed, this text involves key second-personal elements,
in a way that demonstrates precisely the link between recognition and the second-personal which I want to
challenge.
Molly Farneth has recently offered a reading of this later section along these lines, as follows:
Through their acts of confession and forgiveness, the two consciousnesses recognize themselves and
one another as loci of authority and accountability. They acknowledge their selfsameness as acting
and judging subjects who can be held accountable for their actions and judgments by others. These
others, likewise, are also acting and judging subjects, fit to be held accountable. The wicked and judg-
ing consciousnesses acknowledge this fact not only in word but also in deed, in the confession and
forgiveness that symbolize and actualize their agency, authority, and accountability. They perform—
and they bring into being—a relationship of reciprocal recognition (Farneth, 2017, p. 76).6
Thus, on this reading of this section, mutual recognition is achieved through shared confession and forgiveness: to
confess and seek forgiveness is to see the other as a judge, with the authority to hold one to account; to hold some-
one to account is to adopt a second-personal relation to them, which is itself mutual; therefore, on this reading,
Hegel's treatment of reciprocal recognition is fundamentally and inherently second-personal.
However, I want to suggest that this second-personal approach to the text is harder to substantiate than it may
appear, and that in fact when read more carefully, there is no role for second-personal authority in the account it
offers of forgiveness here, and thus there is also no such role in the mutual recognition that this forgiveness involves.
But before making my case, it is necessary to set out this part of Hegel's text in a little more detail, so we can see
more clearly where the second-personal reading goes wrong.
Hegel's account of confession and forgiveness arises out of his prior critique of conscience, where conscience
itself is a response to the difficulties with morality, and the claims to moral knowledge based on various methods
such as Kant's test of universalizability. When these tests are shown to fail, it seems that individual conscience is all
that is left as an arbiter of moral truth. However, conscience itself becomes solipsistic and subjectivist, thinking that
all that matters is that it follows its good intentions. It then becomes accused of evil and hypocrisy by the conscious-
ness which abides by the duties laid down by the moral order: evil because it breaks those obligations, and hypocriti-
cal because it claims to be interested in morality while flouting moral rules. This judging consciousness thus accuses
the other consciousness of wickedness. But the judging consciousness can be accused of wickedness in its turn, as it
too has elements of evil and hypocrisy. The wicked consciousness then sees this, and so feels able to confess its
wickedness to the judging consciousness, expecting this confession to be reciprocated, as it expects the judging con-
sciousness to acknowledge that they are both equally wicked—leading to mutual recognition.
But the judging conscience does not reciprocate, but instead becomes the “hard heart” who continues to con-
demn the wicked consciousness:
But the admission of the one who is evil, It's me, is not reciprocated with the same confession. This is
not what the judging consciousness had in mind—quite the contrary! The judging consciousness
repulses this community away from itself; and it is the hard heart which exists for itself and which
rejects any continuity with the other (Hegel, 1988b, pp. 438–9, §667).
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The hard-hearted judging consciousness then becomes the one who can be accused of wickedness, while it descends
into the deranged pure interiority of the “beautiful soul.” As a result, the hard heart itself breaks, finally giving rise to
mutual forgiveness between the two consciousnesses, out of which recognition arises.
Now, for Farneth, this recognition takes the form of each consciousness seeing the other as standing in judge-
ment over it, while it reciprocally stands in judgement over the other, in a way that would fit Darwall's account of
second-personal recognition within a community of equals. She writes as follows:
The relationship of reciprocal recognition is premised on the epistemic and practical acknowledgment
that oneself and the other are both subject and object, and that oneself and the other stand in equal
positions of responsibility to one another for one's commitments. Confession and forgiveness are
practices of contesting and revising norms and judgments within this structure of reciprocal recogni-
tion. In this view, practices of conflict and reconciliation are ongoing within relationships of reciprocal
recognition (Farneth, 2017, p. 79).
On an account like Farneth's, therefore, this section is all about achieving a mutual recognition of authority relations,
as we each come to accept judgement from the other while seeing that we can judge them in turn, so that the recog-
nition arrived at here is intrinsically second-personal. But is Farneth right in her reading of this section?
To see why she might not be, it is useful to distinguish two forms of forgiveness:
a. I forgive you because I realize I am not in a position to judge you, as I realize I could have acted as badly as you
have done, given my own limitations.
b. I forgive you, because I have the authority to waive my judgement over you, so I no longer hold you to account.
Forgiveness of type (b) is second-personal, as here I have authority over you, but I choose to set aside your
wrong-doings; and to seek forgiveness in this situation is to recognize the accuser as a judge who holds you to
account, in a second-personal manner. But forgiveness of type (a) is arguably not second-personal, as in forgiving
you because I see that we are both equally sinners, I forgive you because I precisely see that I cannot judge you or
hold you to account; and in confessing, you do not recognize me as a judge, but as a fellow sinner, who therefore
cannot stand in judgement over you, so again this is not a second-personal relation of authority, as authority is
exactly what is suspended in this situation, once our shared sinfulness is acknowledged.7
Given this distinction, it can then I think be argued that it is precisely this non-second-personal notion of forgive-
ness (forgiveness of type (a)) that is in play in Hegel's text, so that the recognition involved is also not second-per-
sonal. For, when the wicked consciousness confesses to the supposed judge, the former expects the latter not to
waive his authority over him, but instead to admit that he has no such authority, as the “judge” is just as bad as him-
self, the so-called sinner. So the wicked consciousness does not seek second-personal forgiveness, as forgiveness
from someone who he thinks can legitimately judge him (forgiveness of type (b)). Rather, he expects the “judge” to
acknowledge the fundamental similarity between them, as fellow sinners, and so therefore admit that the “judge”
has no authority, and so is not really entitled to be a judge at all, as they are both on a par. So the recognition the
wicked consciousness seeks from the judge is as a fellow-sinner, not as someone who is forgiven by the judge qua
judge.
I think that this is Hegel's view of the situation is made clear in the following passages:
As [the wicked consciousness] sees this likeness [Gleichheit: cf. equality] and declares it, he confesses
to the other, and he equally expects that the other, who has in fact put himself in a position that is on
a par with his own, will reciprocate his speech and in his own words will declare their likeness so that
recognitional existence [das anerkennende Dasein] will make its appearance. His confession is not an
abasement, nor a humiliation, nor a casting aside of himself [Wegwerfung] in his relationship with the
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other, for this declaration is not something one-sided through which he would posit his unlikeness
[Ungleichheit] with the other. On the contrary, he expresses himself solely on account of his intuition
of the likeness of the other with him, that is, he gives expression on his own part to their likeness in his
confession, and he does this because language is the existence [Dasein] of spirit as the immediate self.
He thus expects that the other will make his own contribution to this existence [Dasein]
(Hegel, 1988b, p. 438, §666).
As I would read this passage, the key thing is that the wicked consciousness, having confessed his wickedness,
expects the other consciousness to do likewise, and so express their equality or likeness in this regard—that when it
comes to wickedness, they are both on a par. It is only this step that leads to “recognitional existence”
(anerkennende Dasein) making its appearance. For, it is only where this likeness is being recognized, that recognition
begins to fully constitute its own sphere of existence (the ethical substance, if you will). Before that, we have not
arrived at “recognition” in the full sense of the word.
But the problem is that the judge keeps insisting that he does have authority over the wicked consciousness, by
insisting that they are not equal in this respect, so that he is better than the consciousness who has declared his
wickedness, and so can stand as judge over the latter: this claim to parity “is not what the judging consciousness had
in mind—quite the contrary! The judging consciousness repulses this community away from itself,” a community
which the wicked consciousness was seeking through confession, through a recognition of shared sinfulness. The
judging consciousness thus fails to see the fundamentally Lutheran point, that we are all equally sinners, and that
the only being capable of judging us is beyond any particular other individual—and by whom (for all the “judge”
knows) the wicked consciousness is in fact already forgiven:
It [i.e., the hard-hearted judging consciousness] thereby shows itself as the spirit-forsaken and spirit-
denying consciousness; for it does not recognise that spirit is the absolute certainty of itself, is master
[Meister] over every deed and actuality, and can cast them off [abwerfen] and make them as if they
had never happened… It is therefore the hard heart himself who is putting obstacles in the way of the
other's return from the deed into the spiritual existence [Dasein] of speech and into the likeness
[Gleichheit] of spirit, and by virtue of its hardness of heart, it engenders the unlikeness [Ungleichheit]
which is still present (Hegel, 1988b, p. 439, §667).
So, the problem with the judge's hard heart is not that he chooses to continue to condemn when really he
should waive that condemnation and forgive in this sense (type (b) forgiveness); rather, the problem is that
he chooses to continue to act as a judge at all—when by recognizing his likeness or equality [Gleichheit] with the
wicked consciousness, this is a form of authority he should give up entirely and so forgive in sense (a). Instead, he
should acknowledge that when it comes to the capacity for casting judgement,8 this is a capacity that belongs to a
“Master,” which stands over them both, and may (for all they know) have forgiven the other person who the hard
hearted judge is trying to condemn—where it is then no accident that Hegel now makes the transition into a chapter
on Religion, in pointing to a higher source of authority that lies beyond our own as sinful human beings, albeit one
that itself “appears in [our] midst” (Hegel, 1988b, p. 442, §671), by also appearing to us in human form and thus as a
sinner like ourselves, who can thereby take on our sins, while assuring us that we will find forgiveness in an authority
which also loves us.
If this reading of these passages is correct, then the recognition the wicked consciousness seeks, and which the
judge finally gives when his hard heart is broken and he no longer is a judge, is not second-personal, as there is no
authority relation present, precisely because in having his heart broken, the consciousness forsakes any such author-
ity over others. Thus, the wicked consciousness wants to be recognized as a fellow sinner, which gives him no
authority over the judge; and once the hard heart of the judge breaks, the judge no longer wants to be recognized as
a judge, but likewise as a sinner who learns to “judge not!” The wicked consciousness therefore learns to confess,
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while once its hard heart is overcome, the judging consciousness learns not to judge, and so renounces the “divisive
thought, and the hard-heartedness of the Being-for-itself which clings to it, because it in facts intuits itself in the first
[consciousness, namely the wicked one]” (Hegel, 1988b, p. 440, §670). So the recognition each seeks is recognition
of their shared ontological status, as sinners, but not of anything second-personal; and the forgiveness each seeks
from the other is not that of a judge either, but that of a fellow sinner, which (I have argued) is also not second-per-
sonal. Thus, the standpoint of the authoritative judge is, in a certain way, overcome in the very course of Hegel's pre-
sentation: that is to say, this picture is actively taken up but then transcended. It would thus seem that we make a
serious error if we simply remain within the authority picture, because it is Hegel's very point that it has to be set
aside. If that is right, then not only is Hegel's conception of recognition not second-personal—his ultimate conception
of mutual recognition is only reached in overcoming the limited perspective of a second-personal relation.
Thus, while Hegel's discussion of confession and forgiveness in this “Conscience” section presents us with an
important culminating account of mutual recognition, it nonetheless seems not to be recognition of a second-
personal kind. If this is right, it would then follow that for Hegel, recognition is not fundamentally a second-personal
relation: for, one can seek mutual recognition as a fellow sinner, which ipso facto involves the waiving of any such
relation. It thus seems that there is conclusive textual evidence that on Hegel's conception at least, there is no neces-
sary relation between recognition and the second-personal.
The question might now be asked, however, how much does Hegel's conception of recognition without second-
personal authority rely on the explicitly theological context in which it is developed? That is, in Hegel's view, does
recognition of ourselves as fellow sinners require us to have some conception of a divine authority as judge and if so
in what form, or could a shared sense of our moral infirmities be accomplished in a more secular manner?; and in fact
does recognition of others in a way that is not second-personal require us to view ourselves us sinners at all, or might
it be possible without this sense of mutual sinfulness? To answer the first question satisfactorily would require us to
go more deeply into Hegel's philosophy of religion than is possible here. But in what follows I will say more that
addresses the second question. For, in my view, while Hegel uses the recognition involved in confession at this junc-
ture in the Phenomenology as an important transition point from the “Spirit” chapter to the one on religion that fol-
lows, as making a natural bridge from the one to the other, he nonetheless is not committed to confession and the
theological context it is given here as being the only way to recognize others without second-personal authority—
and I will now suggest that this is the case by looking at the master/slave dialectic, even though ironically this has
been used by many to claim that Hegelian recognition is in fact all about second-personal authority. In the next sec-
tion, I will therefore first consider this reading of that part of the text, and offer an alternative based on the lessons
we have learned from looking at the confession and forgiveness section in the discussion above.
3 | RECOGNITION IN THE MASTER/SLAVE DIALECTIC
One important way in which the reading I have offered here of the forgiveness section could be challenged, is on the
basis that it does not make sense of what is obviously another key text on this topic, namely the master/slave dialec-
tic in the Phenomenology. For, it may seem that this can only be properly understood if in this text recognition is
treated in second-personal terms; and it is doubtless partly because the master/slave dialectic has been treated this
way that the forgiveness section has been interpreted likewise. For, based on the master/slave dialectic, it is very
natural and tempting to hold that recognition involves a second-personal relation, along the following lines:
1. A second-personal relation is a relation of authority.
2. The struggle for recognition in the master/slave dialectic is a struggle to have one's authority recognized.
3. The resolution of that struggle is when each side recognizes their mutual authority, as fellow members of a moral
community.
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Let me say a little more about each step, to explain why this argument is tempting.
The first step just follows the conception of the second-personal to be found in Darwall, for example, when he
writes: “Second-personal reasons are invariably tied to a distinctively second-personal kind of practical authority: the
authority to make a demand or claim” (Darwall, 2006, p. 11).
The second step adopts a reading of the master/slave dialectic that has become quite common, which holds that
the Hegelian struggle for recognition is a struggle of the one consciousness to have its authority over the other rec-
ognized by the other. An influential reading of this sort can be found in the work of Terry Pinkard, for example, who
reconstructs the dialectic as follows: As an agent, I need to think I am acting on authoritative reasons for action,
where such reasons cannot come from objects, or desires I happen to have, as to treat these as authoritative would
undermine my independence. But other subjects can come to see my goals and projects as authoritative over them,
in a way that does not undermine my independence, as it gives me authority over these subjects. Thus, by getting
my goals and projects to be accepted as authoritative by others because they are my goals and projects, I can see
myself rather than objects as the source of reasons. And in seeing my goals and projects as authoritative over others,
but by refusing to see their goals and projects as authoritative over me, I can maintain my independence. I therefore
seek second-personal authority over others, but refuse to recognize their authority over me, and so refuse to accept
any accountability to them. In this way, therefore, each consciousness comes to seek one-sided second-personal rec-
ognition of the other, as each tries to get the other to acknowledge its authority over them as reason-giving, but
without acknowledging the other's authority over them in turn, thus leading to the life-and-death struggle between
the two consciousnesses. Finally, the last step is taken later in the process, when each side acknowledges their
mutual authority, as fellow members of the moral community. Pinkard thus summarizes Hegel's aim in this text as fol-
lows: “The dialectic of master and slave was initiated by each identifying his own projects as authoritative for what
counted as good reasons for belief and action, but each has now found that he cannot identify what is his own with-
out reference to the other's point of view…” (Pinkard, 1994, p. 62). Read in this way, the incorporation of second-
personal relations into it is then very natural, as we are said to move from the one-sided claims to authority involved
in the struggle that leads to the master/slave relation, to the mutual authority of the community of persons that then
emerges out of the failures of that relation.9
However, while it would be wrong to deny that Pinkard's reading is one way of interpreting this highly complex
text, it is important to see that the reading offered above in Section 2 concerning the forgiveness section places
pressure on this sort of account. For, as is commonly the case with the Phenomenology, problems for an outlook at
an earlier stage of the book are resolved at a later stage, where the forgiveness section is of course the obvious place
to look for the resolution of the difficulties which consciousness faces in the master/slave dialectic. But then, if I am
right to have argued that there is no second-personal authority involved in the former, then it would seem we should
be cautious about making second-personal authority central to the latter, as it would then be hard to see how the
forgiveness section resolves the problems raised in the master/slave dialectic. Thus, it would seem that if we reject
Step 3 in the outline of the argument above, we should also revisit Step 2, and question whether “The struggle for
recognition in the master/slave dialectic is a struggle to have one's authority recognized.”
The puzzle then, however, is to provide an account of that dialectic, and the life and death struggle that lies at
its heart, if it is not brought about by a struggle over authority, as Pinkard and others claim. How else are we to make
sense of what leads to the life and death struggle, if not in these second-personal terms? It is this alternative reading
which I will now attempt to provide.
To do so, I will focus on the key passage where the life and death struggle is introduced. This comes immediately
after the schematic outline of mutual recognition, which I mentioned previously (Hegel, 1988b, pp. 127–129,
§§177–184), where Hegel sets that mutual recognition aside to focus on the case of one-sided recognition and what
that involves, as it is only recognition in this form that is possible for consciousness at this stage. The problem for
consciousness, however, is that while “one individual is confronted by another individual,” and while each conscious-
ness sees itself as an individual, it does not yet see the other as such, or know that this is how it is seen by the other.
Thus, “[e]ach is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and therefore its own self-certainty still has no
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truth” (Hegel, 1988b, §186, p. 130), because it has not yet been recognized by another individual. This is what it now
sets out to achieve, in a way that leads to the life and death struggle, as Hegel explains in a crucial passage:
However, the presentation [Darstellung] of itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists
in showing itself to be the pure negation of its objective mode [gegenständlichen Weise], that is, in
showing that it is not tied down [geknüpft] to any determinate existence [Dasein], or to the universal
individuality of existence, that it is not tied down to life. This presentation is the doubled act, namely,
both what the other does and what is done by way of oneself. Insofar as it is what is done by the
other, each thus aims at the death of the other. However, the second aspect is also therein present,
namely, what is done by way of oneself, for the former involves putting one's own life on the line. The
relation of both self-consciousnesses is thus determined in such a way that it is through a life and
death struggle that each proves themselves, and prove their worth to each other (Hegel, 1988b,
p. 130, §187).
On the basis of this passage, which is the key explanation for the life and death struggle, what drives that strug-
gle is not that each consciousness seeks a one-sided recognition of their authority over the other, but rather of their
ontological status as beings who are more than merely animal: to be recognized, the individual consciousness must
ensure the other is no mere living being, and it must ensure in turn that the other recognizes that it is no mere living
being. To achieve this, at this stage of the dialectic, the demonstration of the capacity to risk its own life is required
of each consciousness, which because each seeks to demonstrate this to the other in a “doubled act,” leads to the
life and death struggle.
Of course, this point has also been noted by other commentators. A classic reading of this sort can be found in
Alexandre Kojève's treatment of the Phenomenology, to which this dialectic is obviously central. For Kojève, the aim
of the struggle is to be recognized by the other person as a subject who is free of their biological nature, by demon-
strating a willingness to risk one's life, and that this is what the master manages to achieve in relation to the slave:
“[The Master] ‘brought to light’, proved (bewährt), realized, and revealed his superiority over biological existence, over
his biological existence, over the natural World in general and over everything that knows itself and that he knows to
be bound to this World, in particular, over the Slave” (Kojève, 1947, p. 202, Kojève, 1969, p. 45). This reading is also
adopted by those who follow in Kojève's wake, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Francis Fukuyama.10
Based on this Kojèvian account, therefore, it can be argued that the Hegelian struggle for recognition is not
second-personal, as the issue of authority of one consciousness over the other is not what is at stake. Likewise, the
resolution of this struggle is not a moral community of person's recognizing mutual second-personal authority, but a
society in which one's ontological freedom as a person can be recognized without needing to engage in life-and-
death struggle or master/slave relations, but by acting on a moral basis within state—which is why, Hegel argues, this
struggle only pertains to the state of nature and not to life in the modern world.11 It would therefore seem that at
least on this Kojèvian reading, what Hegel understands by recognition in the context of the master/slave dialectic
does not involve anything second-personal, while at the same time we have a perfectly adequate account of the gen-
esis of the life and death struggle, which is what was required.
In response, however, it could be argued that the only reason why a consciousness needs to show its indepen-
dence from life is precisely to show that it thereby has the status required to be authoritative over the other, so that
it is still a second-personal issue after all. An argument along these lines is suggested by Jay Bernstein when he
writes as follows:
The idea that one's authority to make claims stakes one to that authority such that it becomes the
essential component of one's self-understanding is worked out in Hegel's thesis that in order to dem-
onstrate that one is a self-consciousness requires the risk of life, the risk of everything for the sake of
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that authority, the risk of life for the sake of being recognized as having that status and standing
(Bernstein, 2015, p. 189).
Here, Bernstein seems to hold, the reason underlying the staking of life in the life and death struggle precisely is an
issue of interpersonal authority, which would make it second-personal after all.
However, once again I think it is possible to read this text differently, along the following lines. First, consciousness
thinks of itself as an I, as more than a merely natural being. But for others to appear to it as subjects, they must prove
themselves as more than natural beings—while to be seen by such subjects as more than a natural being, consciousness
must prove its subjecthood to them. If this did not happen, consciousness would be stuck in dialectic of desire, as con-
sciousness needs self-negating subjects to escape this dialectic,12 while such subjects must negate themselves by fol-
lowing consciousness's coercive will (which is not the same as consumption on the one hand or authority on the other),
and so see this consciousness as a subject rather than an object. Thus a process by which a consciousness recognises
others as subjects, and gets to be recognised as a subject, requires each side to risk its life, as the only way to escape
the dialectic of desire is through subjects that are prepared to negate themselves. On this account, therefore, the life
and death struggle emerges not from the need of consciousness to get its second-personal authority recognised, but to
get itself recognised as an “independent self-consciousness” [selbständiges Selbstbewußtsein] (Hegel, 1988b, p. 131,
§187) which is free of life, with an ontological status that is not merely that of a living being.
My claim, therefore, is that seen in the light of our conclusions from the forgiveness section, it is then perfectly
possible to make sense of the master/slave dialectic without appealing to ideas of second-personal authority, in the
way that our earlier conclusions in Section 2 require. To this extent, the master/slave dialectic gives us no grounds
to question those conclusions, and there is nothing in the master/slave dialectic that blocks the reading of the for-
giveness section which has been developed. But there is also a more positive substantive connection: The master/
slave dialectic, I have suggested, is about the attempt to receive ontological recognition for the fact that I am more
than merely alive, that I am not tied to life, but a purely spiritual being, in a way that ultimately proves unsuccessful.
Correspondingly, the discussion of the forgiveness passage focuses on the fact that we are all equally sinners—so
not purely spiritual beings that can fully detach from our limited contingent living existence. So there is a sense in
which the mutual recognition of forgiveness acknowledges something about us that the first struggle did not cor-
rectly bring into view. That is, full ontological recognition of what it means to be human is not to be had by being rec-
ognized as a detached spiritual being, but only by partaking in the mutual recognition of being finite spirits.
Finally, even if my more Kojèvian reading of the master/slave dialectic is rejected, and it is argued that there is
indeed a struggle for authority at the heart of the conflict in the life and death struggle, this in itself still does not
undermine what I take to be the central lesson of the forgiveness section: namely, that what mutual recognition
involves is the giving up of second-personal authority, not making it reciprocal in the way that is often supposed,
which in light of the forgiveness section is to provide only a rather superficial resolution to the problems raised by
the master/slave dialectic. For, this section suggests that the problems of the master/slave dialectic are not to be
resolved by making second-personal authority reciprocal, but by abandoning the attempt to claim such authority
altogether.
4 | RECOGNITION AND PERSONS
But now, it might still be asked: even if I am right about these various textual claims, what about the more general
argument I mentioned at the beginning?
1. Recognition is of individuals as persons.
2. To recognize someone as a person is to see them as standing in a second-personal relation to you.
3. Therefore, recognition is second-personal.
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This argument may still seem plausible, independent of anything we find in Hegel. In response, however, I think it
can be suggested that on the basis of Hegel's discussion of confession and forgiveness which we have been consid-
ering, that there are two reasons to question this argument: first, does it go too far in claiming that recognition of
persons must be second-personal?; and second, is the fundamental recognitional relation, at least as Hegel conceives
it, of others as persons at all?
Regarding the first issue, I think it can be claimed that the argument above fails based on considerations from
Hegel's discussion of confession and forgiveness. For, if I am seeking recognition from you as a fellow sinner, is this
not necessarily to see us both as persons, even though not second-personally? We could hardly apply the category
of sinner to animals or gods, so in being seen as a sinner I must be seen as a person; but if being so recognized
involves no second-personal elements (as argued above), it would follow that seeing someone as a person does not
in fact require seeing them as having second-personal authority.
Perhaps, however, this argument might invite a Kantian response. For, it could be suggested, persons are beings
to be treated with dignity and respect, and these are inherently hierarchical notions, involving mutual authority and
hence second-personal relations. This would be lost if we saw others as sinners like ourselves, and with it our ability
to see them as persons; conversely, then, if we do see them as persons, we must see them in second-personal way,
for the sort of Kantian reasons Darwall himself gives.13
However, even on Kant's view, it is not clear why seeing someone as a sinner means one can no longer see them
as a person. I take it that the key aspect of Kant's view is that to see someone as a person is to see them as capable
of acting on the moral law (unlike my cat or my desk), and to esteem them accordingly—that is, to offer them
appraisal respect to this extent,14 and to treat them as non-fungible, and hence as having dignity, not price.15 The
Kantian view thus fundamentally involves seeing the other as a person who is open to judgement for their moral fail-
ures. But it is consistent with this view to hold that as a sinner, I cannot judge them, so I cannot address a second-
personal reason to them—and vice versa. If I say “You should not do that” when thinking of us both as sinners, I am
saying that you are open to judgement, but not from me, so I am not addressing you second-personally—but I am rec-
ognizing you as a person (so we can retain the notion of person as a “forensic term,” to use Locke's well-known des-
ignation).16 It would thus appear possible to recognize someone as a person in a Kantian manner, without seeing
them as standing in a second-personal relation to you qua judge, or indeed without seeing anyone in our moral com-
munity as being able to serve that role, given our propensity for radical evil and the opacity to us of our own motiva-
tions17; instead, the only second-person relation which involves any such capacity to judge might be between us and
someone who lies beyond the human community, namely God. To be clear, I am not claiming that one's conception
of a person cannot be richer than this, or that you could not think that as the kinds of persons we are, some of us
can in fact hold others to account because some of us are less sinful than the picture above assumes, in which case
in fact second-personal relations do hold between us, as we do indeed have the authority to make judgements over
others; but then if Hegel's argument is right, we cannot avoid doing so with a hard heart, and so isolating ourselves
from our shared recognitional existence. Moreover, while I would allow that persons can recognize such authority in
others and have it recognized in them, my investigation was into whether this is necessary to any relation of mutual
recognition, and whether Hegel presents the highest level of mutual recognition in these terms, and once again the
right conclusion seems to be that it is not and he does not.
Finally, perhaps there is another argument why seeing someone as a person requires seeing them as having
second-personal authority, which is worth considering. For, perhaps the very notion of sinfulness only makes sense
if there are norms being violated by the sinner—and that such norms only come into play if people have authority
over themselves and others in order to institute such norms, so that the very notion of a shared sinfulness only
makes sense if second-personal authority is acknowledged, within a constructivist account of how it is that norms
come to be in the first place.
However, of course, this relies on a kind of constructivism about norms, which can certainly be debated in itself,
while I have argued elsewhere that such constructivism is implausible as a reading of Hegel's conception of norma-
tivity.18 Moreover, it seems to have taken us away from the conceptual question concerning recognition from which
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we began: for even if norms have to be grounded in the shared second-person authority of persons, this seems inde-
pendent of considerations involving recognition, and so fails to substantiate the conceptual link which has been our
central concern.
Turning now to the second issue, namely the question as to whether the fundamental recognitional relation is of
others as persons at all, it could also be argued that for Hegel, the first premise in the argument above can be chal-
lenged, as it takes for granted that the fundamental recognition relation is between persons who stand in accountabil-
ity relations to each other. Now, I am not claiming that Hegel nowhere presents recognition in terms of authority
between persons in this manner (e.g., he does so in his discussion of personhood and property in the Philosophy of
Right, §71). But what I think the discussion of the forgiveness section of the Phenomenology shows is that the most
fundamental or the deepest level of mutual recognition does not take the form of having authority over each other
and of holding one another to account, or of recognizing each other as persons with this authority, in the manner of
Darwall's “moral community.” Rather, it is of a different kind, so that authority and accounting relations are made
possible on the basis of a shared ground of a different sort (just as the Philosophy of Right argues that abstract right
and the recognitive relations of claims and demands it involves are only possible on the basis of a shared ethical life,
which go beyond such claims and demands). Thus, when Hegel comes to present his view of the community of
mutually recognizing and hence free individuals that constitute “universal self-consciousness” in §436 of The Philoso-
phy of Mind, this is far from Darwall's model of the “moral community” of mutual accountable and hence equal per-
sons, but of individuals who can nonetheless see themselves as “identical with one another” despite their
individuality in a “speculative manner,” on the model of the relationships which constitute the “substance of ethical
life” such as family, sexual love or patriotism, in which our relations are much richer than between one person and
another.19 As we have seen, this is also fundamental to Hegel's presentation of mutual recognition in the Phenome-
nology, in which individuals come to acknowledge their “likeness” [Gleichheit] not as mutually accountable persons
who have equal authority over one another, but as fellow sinners who are bound together in a community of a rather
different sort.
5 | HEGELIAN RECOGNITION WITHOUT THE SECOND-PERSONAL
Our discussion thus far has been largely negative, in arguing about what Hegelian recognition is not, or does not
have to be. It might be wondered, however, what the positive implications for this view might be: if Hegelian recog-
nition is not second-personal, what is it instead? Moreover, while arguments from second-personal recognition to
reciprocity are familiar and fairly easy to make plausible, if this conception of recognition is dropped, how might such
arguments for reciprocity still be made to work? These will be our concerns in this final section.
On the first point, what we have learned is that viewed from a Hegelian perspective, second-personal recogni-
tion appears to be too narrow: but if so, what has it left out? One answer suggested by the life and death struggle is
that what the subject fears is objectification, by being reduced to an object through desire, or to the exemplification
of a genus as a living thing, or as a tool for the satisfaction of another, and thus what the subject seeks instead
through recognition is to be seen for who they are, as complete individuals—where this is wider than their second-
personal competence and authority (Darwall's recognition respect) or their status and standing (his appraisal respect).
Thus, for example, what is wrong with the way in which the master views the slave is that by seeing them as a means
to their ends, the master does not just fail to accord them the various sorts of respect that they may be due as ratio-
nal subjects, but also no longer sees the slave for who they are at all, but instead as an object to be used, thereby
objectifying them rather than engaging with them as a genuine individual. Likewise, what is wrong with the way in
which the judge sees the confessing consciousness is that this consciousness is defined for the judge by their trans-
gressions, which from this perspective means that the confessing consciousness is limited to their deeds which are
treated as “imperishable” (Hegel, 1988b, p. 440, §669).20 Of course, these failures of recognition may mean in part a
failure to see the second-personal authority of the other21—but it can also be said to be much wider than that, in
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failing to see the other as a whole, for themselves, and so as a failure to relate to them for who they are, rather than
just what they have done. Hegelian recognition is thus arguably a much broader notion than can be accounted for in
purely second-personal terms, which is perhaps more likely to be found in love than in respect.22
On the second point, there might nonetheless be a temptation to think that adopting this broader conception of
recognition will make it harder to make sense of the mutuality or reciprocity condition than if we adopt a second-
personal conception. For, as we mentioned at the outset, Darwall has argued that if I claim second-personal authority
over someone, where this is more than mere coercive power, it seems that I must also be committed to acknowledg-
ing that they have a corresponding second-personal authority to make claims of me. If recognition is not conceived
second-personally, and so we cannot use this argument, which hinges on the related authority/coercion distinction,
the concern may be that any grounds for insisting that genuine recognition must be mutual may seem to have
been lost.
However, I think that even on this broader conception of recognition, an argument for reciprocity can still be
made, along the following lines. The aim would be to establish that to be seen for myself by the other, I have to see
the other for themselves.23 Now, suppose I was not to do this—for example, suppose I see the other as a means, or
objectify them, treating them as an “It” rather than a “Thou” in Buber's terms. But then, how can a subject who I
view in these terms be expected to see me in anything other than ways that are limited to the terms to which I have
reduced them? For example, if I treat the slave as a means, I will expect them to view me in that light, as a way in
which they can do what is required of them by me and so be a slave: but then they cannot recognize me for myself,
but only as a vehicle for their slavery. Or if I objectify the other, then the other will not be able to see me for
myself, as they will be reduced in the ways they can view others by this objectification: for example, how can a per-
son who I view as a sexual object be assumed to be capable of viewing me as anything more than this? For this diffi-
culty to be resolved, even on this model of recognition, it would thus appear that the relation must be reciprocal: the
other must see me for myself, and I must see them for themselves, for to view them more narrowly than that is to
make any hope of the former forlorn. Introducing this issue of objectification can therefore make clearer why con-
ceiving recognition in purely second-personal terms is likely to be too narrow.
Thus, based on the analysis of some key texts and related arguments, we seem to have grounds to question the
tempting suggestion that Hegelian recognition is an essentially second-personal notion. On the contrary, it would





1 The main text is Honneth (1992) and Honneth (1995). For more recent writings on this theme, see amongst others: Hon-
neth (2002) and Honneth (2018). For helpful collections of articles in this Hegelian tradition, see Schmidt Am Busch and
Zurn (2010) and Krijnen (2014).
2 See Darwall (2006), and also Darwall (2013a) and Darwall (2013b). See also Buber (2008) and Buber (2013) and Levi-
nas (1990) and Levinas (1969); on the latter cf. also my discussion in chap. 9 of Stern (2019, pp. 248–287). For a useful
collection of articles which focus on this approach, see Eilan (2016).
3 Compare also Darwall (2021, p. 1) where he makes explicit that “the second person standpoint” cannot be equated with
just “any relating to another, any seeing of another as a ‘you’,” but is a much more specific stance of authority and
accountability. In other recent work, Darwall has broadened out his conception of the second-personal, to include not
just the sort of deontic authority relation found in morality, but also the case of love, which as he allows does not involve
any such authority, but other forms of mutuality such as “holding,” “beholding” and “upholding” (Darwall, 2016). In what
follows, I will focus on the original deontological conception, as this is the one which is most commonly associated with
Darwall's position, and which may seem to present parallels to those readings of Hegel that also see recognition in terms
of authority. As Darwall's later conception is much broader, it may well be less vulnerable to the objections I raise below,
but as it has (so far) been less influential I will not consider it in any detail here.
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4 Cf. Darwall (2006, pp. 269–276), which attributes a view of this sort to Fichte.
5 Translations from Hegel are my own. References to section numbers in the Phenomenology are to those which are used
in English translations from Miller onwards (Hegel, 1977, 2018, 2019), but which are not used in German editions, as they
were not employed in this text by Hegel himself. Unfortunately, the English section numbers are not completely consis-
tent between the translations, but where they differ this has been noted.
6 Cf. Pinkard (2002, pp. 241–242): “In particular, it is the practice of forgiveness, the Christian recognition that we are all
‘sinners’ in the eyes of God, transmuted into a secular practice of forgiveness and reconciliation that brings out what is
really normatively in play in the appeal to conscience: an appeal not to ‘beautiful souls’, but to the recognition that, in
Hegel's terms, our sociality fundamentally commits us to being the ‘masters’ and ‘slaves’ to each other—we are authors
of the law to ourselves only as others co-author the law for us. The ‘ethical world’—the ‘I that is We, and the We that is
I’ exists only in terms of each holding ourselves to the law by holding others to the law, while at the same time they hold
us to the law and hold themselves to the law.” This reading is also broadly similar to the one adopted in Brandom (2019):
chap. 16. It also closely resembles Darwall's account of the “moral community”: “Morality as equal accountability con-
ceives of moral relations in terms of equal respect. In seeing ourselves as mutually accountable, we accord one another
the standing to demand certain conduct of each other as equal members of the moral community”
(Darwall, 2006, p. 119).
7 Cf. Harris (1995, p. 503), who writes of this discussion in the Phenomenology: “[I]t is more accurate to say, with Madame
de Staël, that one becomes ‘very indulgent’, than that one ‘pardons’. For one knows that one is not in a position to par-
don. ‘There, but for the grace of God, go I’ is what one says at best; and often only, ‘I am glad it was not me who had to
act’. In these formulas one can see already that it is the need for moral judgement that is suspended.” It should also be
noted that attempts to identify a literary source for Hegel's text here have led back to F. H. Jacobi's philosophical novel
Woldemar (see Falke, 1996, pp. 318–328, Speight, 2001, pp. 112–115), which concludes with the injunction “Judge
not!,” while Hegel himself had earlier reflected on this command “Judge not that ye be not judged” (Matthew 7:1) in his
early work “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate” (Hegel, 1971b, pp. 352–359, Hegel, 1971a, pp. 237–244). Hegel
would thus appear to endorse here what has been called “the standard account,” that blame or judgment requires a cer-
tain standing which incorporates a “no-hypocrisy condition”: namely “one forfeits one's standing to blame if one mani-
fests the same flaw that one attempts to criticize in another”: see Bell (2013, p. 272), in which Bell herself argues against
views of this sort.
8 By this I mean judgement in the sense of being able to condemn or forgive as a normative power. Both parties still pos-
sess judgement in the sense of being able to assess normative standards, and to apply those standards to themselves and
others, and hence assess themselves and others as wicked. But what they cannot do, is blame others for failing to meet
those standards, which is what is fundamental to the second-personal approach. As Thomas Khurana has pointed out to
me, it is easier to make this distinction in German than in English, where the ability to assess others would correspond to
“urteilen” and the ability to judge as a normative power would correspond to “beurteilen” (the term Hegel uses most fre-
quently here) or “richten” (which is the language used by Luther in his German Bible for the translation of Matthew 7:1—
see Luther (1883), Abteilung 3: Die Deutsche Bibel vols 1–12, vol 6, p. 37; cf. also Hegel, 1971b, p. 352).
9 A similar view can be found in Robert Brandom's reading of Hegel: “Hegel understands normative statuses of authority
and responsibility as the products of the normative attitudes of subjects, who practically take or treat each other as
authoritative or responsible, who acknowledge or attribute authority and hold each other responsible. His generic term
for social-practical attitudes of taking or treating someone as the subject of normative statuses is ‘recognition’
[Anerkennung]. He takes that normative statuses such as authority and responsibility are instituted when recognitive atti-
tudes have a distinctive social structure: when they take the form of mutual or reciprocal [gegenseitig] recognition”
(Brandom, 2019, p. 12).
10 Cf. Sartre (1943, p. 311) and Sartre (1958, p. 237): “[T]o the extent that the Other apprehends me as bound to a body
and immersed in life, I am myself only an Other. In order to make myself recognized by the Other, I must risk my own life.
To risk one's own life, in fact, is to reveal oneself as not-bound to the objective form or to any determined existence—as
not-bound to life.” Fukuyama (1992, pp. 150–151): “The reason that I fight is to get another human being to recognize
the fact that I am willing to risk my life, and that I am therefore free and authentically human… Only man is capable of
engaging in a bloody battle for the sole purpose of demonstrating that he has contempt for his own life, that he is some-
thing more than a complicated machine or a ‘slave to his passions’, in short that he has a specifically human dignity
because he is free.”
11 Cf. Hegel (1991: §432Z): “[In the state] the individual makes themselves worthy of this recognition [as a free and rational
person] by overcoming the naturalness of their self-consciousness and obeying a universal, the will that is in and for itself,
the law… In the state, the citizen derives their honour from the post they fill, from the trade they follow, and from their
working activity of any other kind… [H]onour of this kind is still lacking in the state of nature where individuals, whatever
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they may do, want to force others to recognise them.” Hegel notes that duelling may appear to be a counter-example
here, but rejects it on the grounds that duelling serves a different role, as a crude way of demonstrating that one has not
lost face in relation to the law, rather than one's indifference to life as such. (References to the Enzyklopädie are to the
section numbers given in German and English editions, where if these come from the students notes appended to these
sections, this has been marked with a “Z” for “Zusatz”).
12 Cf. Hegel (1988b, p. 126, §175).
13 Cf. Darwall (2006, p. 14, pp. 60–61).
14 See Darwall (1977) and Darwall (2006, pp. 122–126) for further discussion of this notion of appraisal respect.
15 See Kant (1786:4, pp. 434–435).
16 Locke (1975, pp. 346–347) [Book II, chap. XXVII, §26]: “[Person] is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their
Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery… And conformable to this,
the Apostle tells us, that at the Great Day, when every one shall receive according to his doings, the secrets of all Hearts
shall be laid open. The Sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that they themselves in what
Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances soever that consciousnesses adhere to, are the same, that committed
those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them.” Locke thus also seems to accept that what is distinctive of per-
sons is that they can be judged, but not that this necessarily makes them capable of standing in judgement over others.
17 Cf. respectively Kant (1793:6, pp. 32–39) and Kant (1786:4, p. 407).
18 Cf. Stern (2017).
19 For Darwall's conception of the moral community, see above Note 6. For a similarly “thin” conception of recognition,
cf. Wallace (2019, p. 86): “Interpersonal recognition is achieved when we act in a way that deprives others of a warrant
to resent our treatment of them. In acknowledging the significance of their claims against us, as constraints on our
decision-making, we also acknowledge their moral standing as individuals whose interests matter equally.” Once one sees
how inadequate this characterisation would be to the examples Hegel takes from ethical life—of family, sexual love,
patriotism—one sees how far short this account falls of his conception of recognition, just as it falls short of his account
of the recognition found in mutual confession.
20 Cf. Hegel's reflections in “The Spirit of Christianity” on the command to “Judge not”: “Before the law the criminal is noth-
ing but a criminal. Yet the law is a fragment of human nature, and so is being a criminal; if the law were a whole, an abso-
lute, then the criminal would be nothing but a criminal… [T]he sinner is more than a sin existent, a trespass possessed of
personality; he is a man, trespass and fate are in him, but he can return to himself again, and if he does so, then trespass
and fate are under him. The elements of reality are dissolved; spirit and body are severed; the deed still subsists, but only
as something past, as a fragment, as dead remains” (Hegel, 1971b, pp. 353–354, Hegel, 1971a, p. 238). I take Hegel's
claim here to be that viewed from the perspective of the judge, the sinner is nothing more than their sinfulness which
they therefore cannot escape and which therefore cannot be forgiven, but viewed from the perspective of a fellow sin-
ner, their personality as a whole becomes visible, rather than being reduced to their deeds, leaving open the possibility of
reform. Cf. also Hegel (1983, vol 3, p. 247) and Hegel (1988a, pp. 466–467): “imputation… only applies in the region
of finitude, where the subject stands as a single person, not in the region of free spirit. It is characteristic of the region of
finitude that all individuals remain what they are. If they have done evil, then they are evil: evil is in them as their quality.
But already in the sphere of morality, and still more in that of religion, spirit is known to be free, to be affirmative within
itself, so that its limitation, which extends to evil, is a nullity for the infinitude of spirit. Spirit can undo what has been
done. The action certainly remains in the memory, but spirit strips it away. Imputation, therefore, does not attain to this
sphere.”
21 Though this could also be disputed: cf. Butler (2005, p. 43): “‘Oh, now I know who you are’: at this moment I cease to
address you or to be addressed by you.”
22 Heikki Ikäheimo has also suggested that there is more to recognition than the sort of deontological features which figure
in second-personal accounts, claiming that there is also an “axiological” dimension: “Many contemporary readings tend
to see recognition in Hegel predominantly, and sometimes exclusively, in deontological terms of norms, authority and
respect, and underrate or simply leave out the axiological dimension of values, concern, care and love. As important as
the deontological dimension is and as valuable as insights about it are, focusing on it alone is both a one-sided reading of
Hegel's text and a one-sided view of recognition in general” (Ikäheimo, 2014, p. 30). As he points out elsewhere, Honneth
himself distinguishes the recognition involved in love from that of respect and esteem: see Ikäheimo (2007, p. 227) and
Honneth (1992) and Honneth (1995).
23 I take it that this is the most significant relational direction, if we are to look for an argument modelled on the master/
slave dialectic, where in my view the central question is whether the master has to recognise the slave as more than just
a slave in the end, if they are to achieve recognition for themselves, rather than the converse question whether the slave
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can recognise the master in a non-objectifying way even if they are only seen by the master as a slave—where this is less
significant to the refutation of the master which is the focus of the dialectic, because even if it were possible, the master
would not be able to grasp this possibility, given the way they have themselves objectified the slave. For further discus-
sion of the question of what is meant by reciprocity in discussions of recognition, see Rähme (2013).
24 I am grateful to the audience at the conference at which this paper was presented, on “The Struggle for Recognition and
the Authority of the Second Person,” Yale 2018—and particularly to Peter Dews, who was my commentator on that
occasion. I am also grateful for comments on drafts of the paper from James Lewis and Boris Rähme, and anonymous ref-
erees for this journal—and especially to Thomas Khurana and Joseph Schear, who were particularly generous with their
time and encouragement.
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